Files
agents/.gitea/workflows/agent.yml
T
senior a885142e30 @senior: issue #17 — live agent capability table via Gitea 1.27 /api/v1/token
skill-gitea-api.sh now introspects each agent's own PAT (AGENT_TOKEN +
TOKEN_PM/SENIOR/JUNIOR/LEAD/QA) via GET /api/v1/token — a Gitea 1.27+
self-introspection endpoint (token-in, scopes-out, no password) — and bakes a
live, always-accurate 'who can do what' matrix into SKILL.md. Every agent that
loads gitea-api sees every teammate's real scopes; no hand-maintained table to
drift when scopes rotate. Falls back to a static note on <1.27 or unset tokens.

agent.yml passes GITHUB_SERVER_URL + the per-agent TOKEN_* secrets into the
gitea-api skill step so the script can introspect them. run-agent.sh adds a
roster note pointing agents to the matrix for capability-based routing.

Least-privilege gating (plan point #3) was already done in issue #22 via
agents.json skills arrays + install-opencode.sh permission.skill scoping, so
no redundant case gates are added here.
2026-07-04 10:10:38 +00:00

253 lines
13 KiB
YAML

name: agent
# Reusable AI-agent workflow, shared across repos. A caller repo triggers on issue_comment/issues
# and invokes this via: uses: ffaerber/agents/.gitea/workflows/agent.yml@main (secrets: inherit).
# The gate + steps run in the caller's event context (github.event.* / github.repository are the caller's).
on:
workflow_call:
jobs:
agent:
# Trusted author only, and only when a known agent is mentioned. This gate is the main
# defense against malicious-issue prompt injection — do not loosen it.
if: >
(github.event.comment == null && github.event.issue.user.login == 'ffaerber') ||
(github.event.comment != null && github.event.comment.user.login == 'ffaerber' &&
!contains(github.event.comment.body, '🤖') &&
(contains(github.event.comment.body, '@pm') ||
contains(github.event.comment.body, '@junior') ||
contains(github.event.comment.body, '@senior') ||
contains(github.event.comment.body, '@lead') ||
contains(github.event.comment.body, '@qa')))
runs-on: ci-runner
steps:
- name: Acknowledge with 👀
env:
GT: ${{ secrets.GITEA_TOKEN }}
CID: ${{ github.event.comment.id }}
NUM: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
run: |
B="${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/api/v1/repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/issues"
if [ -n "$CID" ]; then R="$B/comments/$CID/reactions"; else R="$B/$NUM/reactions"; fi
curl -sS -X POST -H "Authorization: token $GT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"$R" -d '{"content":"eyes"}' -w '\nreact -> HTTP %{http_code}\n' || true
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
token: ${{ secrets.GITEA_TOKEN }}
# This is a REUSABLE workflow (workflow_call): the checkout above clones the CALLER's repo,
# not this `agents` repo — so the externalized step scripts (in THIS repo under
# .gitea/workflows/scripts/) are NOT on disk yet. Check this repo out into a separate subdir
# and run the scripts from $SCRIPTS. Pinned to @main to match the caller's
# `uses: …/agent.yml@main`, so the scripts and the workflow always move together.
#
# actions/checkout requires `path` to be inside the workspace, so this necessarily lands the
# clone at `.agents-workflow/` INSIDE the tree the dev agent later edits. That checkout dir is
# untracked and looks like a stray artifact: an agent that commits it as a gitlink or
# `rm -rf`s it as "leftover" would destroy the very scripts the post-agent steps run, breaking
# the run with exit 127 and stranding pushed work with no PR (issue #33). To make the run
# immune, the next step copies the scripts to a stable location OUTSIDE the workspace
# (${{ runner.temp }}) and every later step runs from $SCRIPTS there — so nothing the agent
# does to the working tree can break the run's own execution environment.
- name: Fetch shared agent scripts (this repo)
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
repository: ffaerber/agents
ref: main
path: .agents-workflow
token: ${{ secrets.GITEA_TOKEN }}
# Copy the step scripts out of the workspace so the agent cannot break them (issue #33).
# $SCRIPTS points here for every subsequent step, NOT into the in-tree .agents-workflow/.
- name: Stage shared scripts outside the workspace
env:
SRC: ${{ github.workspace }}/.agents-workflow/.gitea/workflows/scripts
DST: ${{ runner.temp }}/agents-scripts
run: |
set -eu
rm -rf "$DST"
mkdir -p "$DST"
cp -a "$SRC"/. "$DST"/
chmod -R a+rx "$DST" || true
echo "staged $(ls -1 "$DST" | wc -l) scripts at $DST"
- name: Route agent + prepare branch
id: prep
env:
SCRIPTS: ${{ runner.temp }}/agents-scripts
BODY: ${{ github.event.comment.body }} # event text via env, never inline in shell
IBODY: ${{ github.event.issue.body }}
# Comment-vs-issue discriminator. Do NOT use github.event_name here: this is a REUSABLE
# (workflow_call) workflow, so on Gitea event_name is 'workflow_call', not the original
# 'issues'/'issue_comment'. The comment id, however, is reliably present in the forwarded
# payload — empty on an issue-opened event, set on a comment event.
CID: ${{ github.event.comment.id }}
IS_PR: ${{ github.event.issue.pull_request }}
NUM: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
GT: ${{ secrets.GITEA_TOKEN }}
TOKEN_PM: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_PM }}
TOKEN_SENIOR: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_SENIOR }}
TOKEN_JUNIOR: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_JUNIOR }}
TOKEN_LEAD: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_LEAD }}
TOKEN_QA: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_QA }}
run: bash "$SCRIPTS/route.sh"
- name: Install opencode + provider config (+ Playwright MCP for browser agents)
env:
SCRIPTS: ${{ runner.temp }}/agents-scripts
OLLAMA_URL: ${{ secrets.OLLAMA_URL }}
OLLAMA_CLOUD_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.OLLAMA_CLOUD_API_KEY }}
NAME: ${{ steps.prep.outputs.name }}
SKILLS: ${{ steps.prep.outputs.skills }} # JSON array of skills this agent may load
run: bash "$SCRIPTS/install-opencode.sh"
- name: Set up read-only SSH alias `node1` (+ opencode skill so the agent actually knows about it)
# 1) Writes the deploy key + an SSH config alias so the agent can run
# `ssh node1 <read-only cmd>` (matches the homelab opencode.json allowlist).
# 2) Emits a `node1-ssh` opencode Skill file under ~/.config/opencode/skills/ so any
# downstream repo's dev agent discovers this capability via OpenCode's skill registry
# rather than having to trial against the permission allowlist. Only emitted when the
# swarm plumbing is actually wired for that caller (SWARM_HOST/SWARM_USER/SSH_PRIV_KEY).
# All three secrets are passed via env and never inlined into shell — this shared workflow
# runs in repos that don't have them and must not fail there.
env:
SCRIPTS: ${{ runner.temp }}/agents-scripts
SWARM_HOST: ${{ secrets.SWARM_HOST }}
SWARM_USER: ${{ secrets.SWARM_USER }}
SSH_PRIV_KEY: ${{ secrets.SSH_PRIV_KEY }}
run: bash "$SCRIPTS/skill-node1-ssh.sh"
- name: Set up `gitea-api` skill (let agents read/write issues, PRs, Actions across repos)
# Mirrors the node1-ssh pattern: emit an opencode Skill file under
# ~/.config/opencode/skills/ so any dev agent discovers the capability via OpenCode's
# skill registry. The credential is the shared AGENT_TOKEN (a PAT whose scopes the
# maintainer set at creation time — issue/repository/organization/misc read+write, cross-repo).
# Only emitted when AGENT_TOKEN is actually present, so repos without it don't get a
# broken skill. The token is passed via env and never inlined into shell.
#
# Live Agent Capability Table (Gitea 1.27+): the per-agent TOKEN_* secrets are also
# passed here so skill-gitea-api.sh can call GET /api/v1/token (a self-introspection
# endpoint — token-in, scopes-out, no password needed) for every teammate and bake a
# live, always-accurate "who can do what" matrix into the skill. Every agent that loads
# gitea-api then sees every teammate's real scopes, with zero manual upkeep. Tokens not
# set for a repo (or a <1.27 instance with no /token endpoint) are skipped silently.
env:
SCRIPTS: ${{ runner.temp }}/agents-scripts
GITHUB_SERVER_URL: ${{ github.server_url }}
AGENT_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.AGENT_TOKEN }}
TOKEN_PM: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_PM }}
TOKEN_SENIOR: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_SENIOR }}
TOKEN_JUNIOR: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_JUNIOR }}
TOKEN_LEAD: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_LEAD }}
TOKEN_QA: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_QA }}
run: bash "$SCRIPTS/skill-gitea-api.sh"
- name: Inspect / fetch image attachments (download only for vision agents)
id: imgs
env:
SCRIPTS: ${{ runner.temp }}/agents-scripts
GT: ${{ secrets.GITEA_TOKEN }}
NUM: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
VISION: ${{ steps.prep.outputs.vision }}
run: bash "$SCRIPTS/fetch-images.sh"
- name: Fetch the full issue thread (shared memory)
env:
SCRIPTS: ${{ runner.temp }}/agents-scripts
GT: ${{ secrets.GITEA_TOKEN }}
NUM: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
run: bash "$SCRIPTS/fetch-thread.sh"
- name: Run agent
id: run
env:
SCRIPTS: ${{ runner.temp }}/agents-scripts
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
# AGENT_TOKEN powers the `gitea-api` skill (cross-repo issue/PR/Actions read+write).
# It is already a required secret for the delegation step below; exposing it here too
# lets the agent process itself call the Gitea API on demand.
AGENT_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.AGENT_TOKEN }}
NAME: ${{ steps.prep.outputs.name }}
MODEL: ${{ steps.prep.outputs.model }}
VISION: ${{ steps.prep.outputs.vision }}
MODE: ${{ steps.prep.outputs.mode }}
HAS_IMAGES: ${{ steps.imgs.outputs.has_images }}
BRANCH: ${{ steps.prep.outputs.branch }}
NUM: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
TITLE: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
IBODY: ${{ github.event.issue.body }}
CMT: ${{ github.event.comment.body }}
FILES: ${{ steps.imgs.outputs.files }} # opencode -f image flags (vision agents only)
run: bash "$SCRIPTS/run-agent.sh"
- name: Build activity log (tool calls + reasoning) from the event stream
id: log
env:
SCRIPTS: ${{ runner.temp }}/agents-scripts
MODE: ${{ steps.prep.outputs.mode }}
run: bash "$SCRIPTS/build-activity-log.sh"
- name: Publish — PR (dev agents) or comment (pm), always reply in the issue
env:
SCRIPTS: ${{ runner.temp }}/agents-scripts
GT: ${{ secrets.GITEA_TOKEN }}
AGENT_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.AGENT_TOKEN }}
TOKEN_PM: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_PM }}
TOKEN_SENIOR: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_SENIOR }}
TOKEN_JUNIOR: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_JUNIOR }}
TOKEN_LEAD: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_LEAD }}
TOKEN_QA: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_QA }}
NAME: ${{ steps.prep.outputs.name }}
MODE: ${{ steps.prep.outputs.mode }}
NUM: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
TITLE: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
BRANCH: ${{ steps.prep.outputs.branch }}
NEW: ${{ steps.prep.outputs.new }}
run: bash "$SCRIPTS/publish.sh"
# Failure-safe: if any step above failed AFTER a dev agent already pushed commits, the normal
# Publish step never ran, so the work would be stranded on the branch with no PR (issue #33).
# This best-effort step opens a PR for the pushed branch so nothing is silently lost. Runs from
# $SCRIPTS (outside the workspace) so it works even if the tree was mangled by the agent.
- name: Rescue — open a PR for pushed work if the run failed
if: failure()
env:
SCRIPTS: ${{ runner.temp }}/agents-scripts
GT: ${{ secrets.GITEA_TOKEN }}
TOKEN_PM: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_PM }}
TOKEN_SENIOR: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_SENIOR }}
TOKEN_JUNIOR: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_JUNIOR }}
TOKEN_LEAD: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_LEAD }}
TOKEN_QA: ${{ secrets.TOKEN_QA }}
NAME: ${{ steps.prep.outputs.name }}
MODE: ${{ steps.prep.outputs.mode }}
NUM: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
TITLE: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
BRANCH: ${{ steps.prep.outputs.branch }}
run: bash "$SCRIPTS/rescue-pr.sh" || true
- name: Mark done with 🚀 (remove 👀)
env:
GT: ${{ secrets.GITEA_TOKEN }}
CID: ${{ github.event.comment.id }}
NUM: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
run: |
B="${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/api/v1/repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/issues"
if [ -n "$CID" ]; then R="$B/comments/$CID/reactions"; else R="$B/$NUM/reactions"; fi
curl -sS -X DELETE -H "Authorization: token $GT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" "$R" -d '{"content":"eyes"}' || true
curl -sS -X POST -H "Authorization: token $GT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" "$R" -d '{"content":"rocket"}' -w '\nreact -> HTTP %{http_code}\n' || true
- name: Mark failed with 😕 (remove 👀)
if: failure()
env:
GT: ${{ secrets.GITEA_TOKEN }}
CID: ${{ github.event.comment.id }}
NUM: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
run: |
B="${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/api/v1/repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/issues"
if [ -n "$CID" ]; then R="$B/comments/$CID/reactions"; else R="$B/$NUM/reactions"; fi
curl -sS -X DELETE -H "Authorization: token $GT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" "$R" -d '{"content":"eyes"}' || true
curl -sS -X POST -H "Authorization: token $GT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" "$R" -d '{"content":"confused"}' -w '\nreact -> HTTP %{http_code}\n' || true