# Security model — agent behavior isolation

Agent behavior — which models run, what skills / permissions / MCP servers they get, and the golden
rules they follow — is defined **only** by this `agents` repository. A caller repository must not be
able to change it.

## For caller repos
Call the shared workflow pinned to this repo's `main`:

```yaml
uses: ffaerber/agents/.gitea/workflows/agent.yml@main
secrets: inherit
```

Do **not** point `uses:` at a fork or a non-`main` ref. The trigger gate, the agent registry, and the
isolation controls all live here on `main`; a caller that repoints it opts out of these protections.

## How isolation is enforced at runtime
The agent runs inside the caller repo's checkout, and opencode auto-discovers project-level config
from the working tree. Because opencode has **no flag to disable that discovery**, the run
(`scripts/run-agent.sh`) quarantines the caller-controlled behavior files for the duration of each
run so they cannot override the agent's configuration or execute code on the runner (which holds the
workflow secrets):

- `opencode.json` / `opencode.jsonc` — provider, model, permission, `mcp`
- `.opencode/` — plugins, skills, agents, commands, tools
- `AGENTS.md` / `CLAUDE.md` — instructions

They are moved aside before opencode starts and restored after it exits, so the committed tree is
unchanged. The authoritative configuration comes from `~/.config/opencode/` (written by
`scripts/install-opencode.sh`), and the authoritative golden rules from `scripts/agent-rules.md`,
injected into the agent prompt. A caller repo's own `AGENTS.md` is informational to humans only and is
never followed as rules by the agent.

**Consequence:** an agent cannot durably edit these quarantined files *during a run* — its changes to
them are not persisted. Change them via a normal human PR instead.